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Summary: Debate on wearing Islamic headscarves in the public 
sphere, including in education institutions, has been one of the most 
heated debates in today’s Europe. The question of the relationship be-
tween human rights and the wearing of an Islamic headscarf in edu-
cation institutions has been posed in many national and international 
jurisdictions, including before the European Court of Human Rights. 
This paper explores the Court’s approach to bans on wearing Islamic 
headscarves in education institutions by analysing its case law on the 
issue. Analysis is focused on the Court’s interpretation of the principle 
of secularism/neutrality and gender equality. The author criticises 
the Court’s overly differential approach, arguing that the principles of 
equality and secularism have been interpreted in a paternalistic and 
simplistic manner. 
1. Introduction
Debate on veils1 has been one of the most heated discussions in to-
day’s Europe (and more broadly) among men and women, decision-mak-
ers and ‘ordinary people’, academics2 and non-academics, Muslims and 
non-Muslims, religious and non-religious people. Discussions have been 
going on in governments and parliaments, university classrooms, private 
homes, academic papers, newspapers, over the internet, and in coffee 
bars. Never has any other garment (including other religious dress) been 
so extensively discussed, and given such signifi cance and multiplicity of 
meaning. 
The veil has acquired meanings (attributed both by the wearer and 
observer) that go far beyond the choice of dress for women, even if the 
debate is predominantly framed in terms of women’s rights and gender 
equality. The veil (un)covers not only the bodies of women who wear it, 
* Ivana RadaËiÊ, PhD in law; research assistant, Ivo Pilar Institute of Social Sciences, 
Croatia.
1  I use ‘veiling’ as a generic term to include the hijab, niqab and burqa. See G Anwar and 
L McKay, ‘Veiling’ Encyclopaedia of Islam and the Muslim World vol 2 (Macmillan, New York 
1994) 721-722.
2  A wide range of disciplines have contributed to these discussions: politics and political 
theory, law and human rights, women’s studies, post-colonial studies, Islamic studies.
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but also the issues of national identity, citizenship, integration, plural-
ism, multiculturalism, liberalism, secularism, fundamentalism, Islamo-
phobia and human rights. As McGoldrick writes, ‘the headscarf-hijab 
debate is thus part of a broader question that is not new, but which is 
becoming more acute -  how do people who disagree over profoundly dif-
ferent matters live together?’3
Indeed, the veil has been the subject of profound disagreement. 
Even women, and among them feminist women, disagree on the symbolic 
meaning of veiling and its relation to gender equality and the rights of 
women, their position being infl uenced by many factors, including race 
and ethic origin, class, religious affi liation, place of residence, and po-
litical orientation. Some women argue that women should be ‘set free’ of 
this ‘patriarchal’ practice, even if they need to be forced to do so,4 others 
are concerned about the way the principle of gender equality has been 
(ab)used to restrict women’s choices and to promote other suspect aims, 
seeing forced unveiling as problematic as forced veiling,5 while yet oth-
ers claim that women have a human right to wear the veil, which cannot 
be limited to the abstract principles of gender equality and secularism 
(which, in their view, serve anyway as a cover for Islamophobia).
Particularly problematic is the question of wearing (different kinds 
of) veil and other religious symbols in schools, schools being ‘miniature 
“communities of citizens”, where pupils learn the principles of public citi-
zenship’.6 The questions raised are: what types of veils (if any) should be 
prohibited; should prohibitions cover only teachers or pupils, or should 
they extend even to university students; and what roles do human rights 
principles have? Is there a right to wear a veil (any kinds or only some), or 
can it be prohibited for the sake of the protection of the rights of others? 
Precisely which rights are at stake?
3  D  McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion: The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford 2006).
4  This is the position of some liberal, Western women, some of whom defi ne themselves 
as feminist, which has been heavily criticised by many Muslim, feminist and non feminist, 
women. It is interesting to note that these women do not discuss their own (patriarchal) 
dress and cultural practices with the same passion and vigour. 
5  This is the category I fall into. While it is very diffi cult for me to understand (different) 
meanings of the practice, or the life experiences of Muslim women who wear (different 
forms of) the veil (or who do not wear it and are harassed for that reason), I can grasp the 
complexities of the problem, the multiple meaning of veiling, the context of discrimination 
against Muslims, Islamophobia, the possibility of abusing the principle of gender equality 
for suspect reasons, and the dangers of portraying women as victims. This is the position 
from which I critique the Court’s judgments. 
6  C Laborde, ‘Secular Philosophy and Muslim Headscarves in Schools’ (2005) 13 (3) Politi-
cal Philosophy 305, 326.
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The question of the relationship between human rights and wear-
ing the veil in education institutions has been posed in many national7 
and international jurisdictions.8 The European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter the Court) faced this question in cases taken by Turkish stu-
dents challenging bans preventing them from wearing the headscarf at 
universities,9 and in the case against Switzerland taken by a primary 
school teacher challenging the ban imposed on her in a primary state 
school.10 This paper explores the Court’s approach to bans on wearing 
Islamic headscarves in education institutions. The analysis is focused on 
the Court’s interpretation of the principle of secularism/neutrality and 
gender equality.
2. Description of cases 
2.1. Prohibitions on teachers: Dahlab v Switzerland
The case was decided on admissibility only in 2001. The applicant 
was a primary school teacher, teaching 4-8 year-old-children at a state 
school in a Geneva Canton. She started to wear the Islamic headscarf a 
year after being appointed a teacher, toward the end of the academic year 
1990/91.11 For the four years of wearing the headscarf she had no prob-
lems, there being no objections from the school or education authorities. 
There was never any complaint from parents or pupils. However, in June 
1996, the Director General for Primary Education requested the appli-
cant to stop wearing the headscarf, considering such conduct contrary 
to Section 6 of the Education Act, which mandates respect of pupils and 
parents’ religious and political beliefs.12 The applicant appealed fi rst to 
the Geneva Cantonal Government, and then to the Federal Court, but 
her appeals were dismissed. Before the Federal Court, she invoked viola-
7  See, for example, the Begum case in the UK, which concerned a pupil who was prohibited 
from wearing a niqab in a state school: R (Shabina Begum) v Headteacher and Governors of 
Denbigh High School [2006] UKHL 15. See also the Lund case in Germany, which concerned 
a primary school teacher wearing a headscarf-hijab (Federal Constitutional Court, judg-
ment of 24 September 2003, BVerfG, 2 BvR 1436/02 <www.bverfg.de>). For an overview of 
comparative practices, see McGoldrick (n 3).
8  See, for example, Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, Rahime Kayhan v Turkey, Communication No/ 8/2005, CEDAW/C/34/D/8/2005; 
Dahlab v Switzerland (dec) (App no 42393/98) ECHR 2001-V; Leyla Sahin v Turkey (App no 
44774/98) 29 June 2004 and [GC] ECHR 2005.
9  Leyla Sahin v Turkey, ibid.
10  Dahlab v Switzerland (n 8).
11  The applicant converted to Islam from Catholicism, which was emphasised both in the 
domestic courts’ decisions and in the Court’s decision. 
12  Section 6 of the Cantonal Public Education Act of 6 November 1940 prescribes: ‘The 
public education system shall ensure that the political and religious beliefs of pupils and 
parents are respected’ Dahlab v Switzerland (n 8) 457.
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tion of her freedom of religion. However, the court held that ‘prohibition 
of the wearing of “powerful” religious symbols’13 was based in law, served 
the legitimate aims of ensuring denominational neutrality in schools, and 
was necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights of 
others (pupils in her class, the rest of the school and their parents) and of 
public order and public safety,14 in view of her special status as a teacher 
of young children, and a civil servant. 
Before the European Court of Human Rights, the applicant argued 
that the prohibition amounted to a violation of the freedom of religion (Ar-
ticle 9) and the right to non-discrimination on the basis of sex (Article 14 
in conjunction with Article 9). The Government claimed that the measure 
was necessary to protect the religious freedoms of parents and students 
and to prevent religious confl ict in schools, and that it was proportion-
ate, taking into account the applicant’s special roles as civil servant.15 
The applicant accepted the principle of denominational neutrality as a 
legitimate aim, but held that it requires only that teaching should be in-
dependent of religious faith and does not prevent teachers from holding 
belief. She also maintained that she never wanted to infl uence her pupils 
religiously and that there was no evidence of any such impact. 
The Court fi rst analysed the Article 9 claim. It reiterated that free-
dom of thought, conscience and religion, as enshrined in Article 9 of 
the Convention, represents one of the foundations of a democratic soci-
ety within the meaning of the Convention and that this freedom implies 
freedom to manifest religion, but that in ‘democratic societies, in which 
several religions coexist within one and the same population, it may be 
necessary to place restrictions on this freedom in order to reconcile the 
interests of the various groups and ensure that everyone’s beliefs are re-
spected.’ It accepted that in the case at issue there was an interference 
with the manifestation of the applicant’s belief, and then proceeded to 
assess whether it could be justifi ed; in other words, whether the interfer-
ence was in accordance with law and ‘necessary in democratic society.’ 
The Court held that the interference was in accordance with law, as in 
13  My emphasis. It is to be noted that the wearing of ‘discrete’ religious symbols by teach-
ers, such as ‘small pieces of jewellery’ (eg the cross) was not considered as contrary to the 
principle of denominational neutrality and was hence not prohibited. Dahlab v Switzerland, 
ibid.
14  There was also the following reference to gender equality in the Federal Court judgment: 
‘It must also be acknowledged that it is diffi cult to reconcile the wearing of a headscarf with 
the principle of gender equality … which is a fundamental value of our society enshrined 
in a specifi c provision of the Federal Constitution (Article 4 § 2) and must be taken into ac-
count by schools.’ Ibid.
15  They also maintained that the applicant had the choice to teach at private schools which 
were not subjected to the requirement of neutrality. However, the applicant argued that she 
had no realistic alternatives, since there were only very few private schools for children in 
the age group she taught, and all were of a religious orientation that she did not share.
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its view the law was suffi ciently precise, even though there was no law 
explicitly prohibiting teachers from wearing headscarves.16 It also held 
that it served the legitimate aims of protecting the rights of others and of 
public order, accepting that the wearing of a headscarf by a teacher may 
threaten both the right of her pupils and their parents, and public order, 
and that it was proportionate in the circumstances of the case.17 In re-
spect of the impact that ‘a powerful external symbol such as the wearing 
of a headscarf may have on the freedom of conscience and religion of very 
young children’, the Court held: 
it cannot be denied outright that the wearing of a headscarf might 
have some kind of proselytising effect, seeing that it appears to be 
imposed on women by a precept which is laid down in the Koran and 
which, as the Federal Court noted, is hard to square with the prin-
ciple of gender equality. It therefore appears diffi cult to reconcile the 
wearing of an Islamic headscarf with the message of tolerance, re-
spect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimination that 
all teachers in a democratic society must convey to their pupils.18
The Court concluded that ‘having regard, above all, to the tender age 
of the children for whom the applicant was responsible as a representa-
tive of the State,’19 the Geneva authorities did not exceed their margin of 
appreciation and that the measure they took was therefore not unreason-
able. In the light of these considerations and those set out by the Federal 
Court, the Court held that the prohibition was ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ and dismissed the claim as manifestly ill-founded.
The Court then analysed the Article 14 claim. The applicant argued 
that the prohibition of wearing the headscarf and other ‘visible religious 
symbols’ constituted discrimination on the basis of sex, in that ‘a man 
belonging to the Muslim faith could teach at a State school without be-
ing subject to any form of prohibition, whereas a woman holding similar 
beliefs had to refrain from practising her religion in order to be able to 
teach.’20 The Court reiterated its principles ‘that the advancement of the 
equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the 
16  The following sources were fond relevant: the above-mentioned Section 6 of the Canton 
of Geneva Public Education Act; Section 120(2) of the Public Education Act, which provides: 
‘Civil servants must be lay persons; derogations from this provision shall be permitted only 
in respect of university teaching staff’; and Article 27 § 3 of the Federal Constitution of 
29 May 1874, which  reads: ‘It shall be possible for members of all faiths to attend State 
schools without being affected in any way in their freedom of conscience or belief’ Dahlab 
v Switzerland (n 8) 457.
17  It was held relevant that the applicant was a representative of the state, that she was 
teaching very young children, and that there were alternatives available to her.
18  N 7 463.
19  Ibid.
20  N 7 463.
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Council of Europe’ and that ‘very weighty reasons would have to be ad-
vanced before a difference in treatment on the ground of sex could be re-
garded as compatible with the Convention’.21 However, as in other indirect 
discrimination cases,22 the formula was not really applied.23 Instead of fo-
cusing on the effect of the measure, the Court looked at its intent. It held: 
… the measure by which the applicant was prohibited, purely in the 
context of her professional duties, from wearing an Islamic headscarf 
was not directed at her as a member of the female sex but pursued 
the legitimate aim of ensuring the neutrality of the State primary-
education system. Such a measure could also be applied to a man 
who, in similar circumstances, wore clothing that clearly identifi ed 
him as a member of a different faith.24
It therefore concluded that there was no discrimination and held the 
claim was manifestly ill-founded. 
2.2 Prohibitions on students: Leyla Sahin v Turkey
This case, the only ‘Islamic headscarf case’ decided on merits, was ad-
judicated by the 4th section of the Court in 2004 and by the Grand Cham-
ber in 2005.25 The applicant, then a student at Istanbul University, was 
refused entry to lectures, access to examination and enrolment to courses, 
for wearing a headscarf, following the issuance by the Vice Chancellor of a 
circular prohibiting the wearing of a headscarf (or beard) at the university 
campus. Before the issuance of the circular, the applicant freely wore the 
headscarf both at Istanbul University and before that at Bursa University 
for her fi rst four years of university education. As she refused to follow the 
21  Ibid 464.
22  The applicant did not argue that the distinction was made explicitly on the basis of sex, 
but that it had a disparate impact on Muslim women who wore the headscarf, and hence 
her claim could best be classifi ed as an indirect discrimination claim. 
23  While the Court has suggested in many cases that indirect discrimination is covered by 
the Article, it was only in Zarb Adami v UK (App no 17209/02) ECHR 2006 that the Court 
fi rst found an indirect discrimination claim established.  Prior to that case, in indirect 
discrimination claims, it has either referred to the legitimate aim/intent of the challenged 
measure, or to a high standard of proof, under which statistics are not suffi cient to estab-
lish prima facie discrimination. 
24  N 7 464.
25  Upon the delivery of the judgment by the 4th Chamber which found no violation of the 
Convention (29 June 2004), the applicant referred the case (on 27 September 2004) to the 
Grand Chamber to hear the case according to Article 43 of the Convention, which accepted 
the jurisdiction (on 10 November 2004). Article 43(2) states that a panel of fi ve judges of the 
Grand Chamber shall accept such requests if the case raises a serious question affecting 
the interpretation or application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of gen-
eral importance for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (opened 
for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) CETS No 005, 213 
UNTS 221 (ECHR).
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dress code, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against her and she 
was issued with a warning. She was later suspended for taking part in a 
protest against the dress code. Penalties were subsequently lifted under 
the Amnesty Law. In the meantime, following her unsuccessful application 
to the Istanbul Administrative Court to set aside the circular (which was 
later affi rmed by the Supreme Administrative Court), the applicant aban-
doned her studies in Turkey and enrolled at Vienna University. 
The applicant argued that her right to respect for private life (Art 8), 
freedom of religion (Art 9), freedom of expression (Art 10), right to edu-
cation (Protocol 1, Art 2) and right to non-discrimination on the basis 
of religion (Art 14) were violated. The government argued that interfer-
ence with the applicant’s rights, based on the (Constitutional) principle 
of secularism and gender equality, was ‘necessary in democratic society’ 
for the protection of the rights of others and of public order. The Chamber 
analysed her complaint under Art 9 and found no violation, while hold-
ing that no separate issue arose under other Articles. The Grand Cham-
ber fi rst analysed the claims under Article 9 and then under Article 2 of 
Protocol 1, holding that the same considerations were applicable under 
both claims. The discrimination claim was also analysed by the Grand 
Chamber, but was dismissed.
The Grand Chamber found that there was interference with Art 9, 
accepting (the Chamber’s fi nding) that by ‘wearing the headscarf, she was 
obeying a religious precept and thereby manifesting her desire to comply 
strictly with the duties imposed by the Islamic faith.’26 It then analysed 
whether interference with her manifestation of religion could be justifi ed 
under Art 9(2). The Court found that interference was in accordance with 
law, as in its opinion the legal source of the prohibition was suffi ciently 
foreseeable and accessible, even though at the time in question there 
was no written law explicitly prohibiting the wearing of an Islamic head-
scarf.27 It then proceeded to assess whether interference was ‘necessary 
26  Leyla Sahin v Turkey (App no 44774/98) [GC] ECHR 2005 78.
27  The relevant law on university students’ dress code (Transitional Section 17 of Law no 
2547) stipulated that the choice of dress is free, provided that it does not contravene the 
laws in force. The Turkish Supreme Court, in its judgment of 9 April 1991, interpreted this 
provision as prohibiting students from wearing the veil, since it saw wearing the veil as con-
trary to the constitutional principle of secularism. Before that, on 7 March 1989, it repealed 
Transitional Section 16 of the Higher-Education Act which provided that a veil or headscarf 
covering the neck and head could be worn on university premises out of religious convic-
tion. The applicant argued that the circular in question was contrary to law (no 2547) and 
that it could not be argued that a valid legal basis for that regulation was the case law of the 
Supreme Court. This was because the Court had no jurisdiction to create new law, a power 
reserved for the Parliament which had never banned headscarves in higher education (even 
after the judgments of the Supreme Court). The Court held that ‘law’ must be understood to 
include both statutory and judge-made law, and found that there was a legal basis for inter-
ference, namely Transitional Section 17 of Law no 2547, in the light of the relevant domestic 
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in a democratic society’, in other words, whether it pursued a legitimate 
aim and whether the means used were proportionate to the aim.
The Grand Chamber fi rst restated the general principles, holding 
that states have a wide margin of appreciation in respect of regulating the 
wearing of religious symbols in education institutions, ‘especially in view 
of the diversity of the approaches taken by national authorities on the is-
sue.’28 The Court then repeated the fi ndings in Dahlab that ‘in democratic 
societies the State is entitled to place restrictions on the wearing of the 
Islamic headscarf if it was incompatible with the pursued aim of protect-
ing the rights of others and public order and public safety’ and, what 
judge Tulkens defi ned as the most problematic aspect in Dahlab,29 that 
the ‘Islamic headscarf could not easily be reconciled with the message of 
tolerance, respect for others and, above all, equality and non-discrimina-
tion.’30 The Court did not, however, mention the differences between the 
Dahlab case and the Leyla Sahin case, and how crucial the fact was that 
Dahlab was a teacher in a state school (and hence a representative of the 
state and a civil servant who had voluntarily accepted an employment 
contract) who taught very young children in the state school, who were 
allegedly susceptible to infl uence. 
The Grand Chamber then analysed the justifi cation for interference 
in the case at issue. Following the Chamber’s approach, it accepted that 
restrictions were based on the principles of secularism and equality, 
which, it held, were also the values underpinning the Convention. Par-
ticular emphasis was placed on gender equality and the rights of wom-
en. The Grand Chamber restated the Chamber’s reasoning that gender 
equality was ‘one of the key principles underlying the Convention and the 
goal to be achieved by members States of the Council of Europe,’31 and 
noted ‘the emphasis placed in the Turkish constitutional system on the 
protection of the rights of women.’32 It then restated the Chamber’s fears 
regarding the impact that
case law.  It also found the law suffi ciently accessible and foreseeable.  For a critique of the 
Court’s approach, see B Cali, ‘International Justice before the European Court of Human 
Rights: Between Legal Cosmopolitanism and Society of States’ in MB Dembour and T Kelly 
(eds), Limits of International Justice: Social and Legal Pesepctives (Cambridge University 
Press, forthcoming 2007); F Benli, ‘Legal Evaluation of the Ban Imposed on University Stu-
dents who Wear the Headscarf Subsequent to the ECtHR’s Ruling in Leyla Sahin v Turkey’ 
< http://www.ihrc.org.uk/fi le/LEGAL_EVALUATION.doc> accessed 20 July 2007. 
28  N 26 109.
29  Dissenting opinion of Judge Tulkens. Ibid.
30  Ibid 12.
31  My emphasis. N 26 115.
32  Ibid. Turkey has, however, often been criticised by UN human rights bodies, including by 
CEDAW Committee, for the situation in respect of women’s rights. See eg CEDAW Commit-
tee, ‘Consideration of Combined Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report of Turkey’ (8 September 
2003) UN Doc CEDAW/C/TUR/4-5.
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wearing such a symbol, which is presented or perceived as a compul-
sory religious duty, may have on those who choose not to wear it in 
a country in which the majority of population adhere to the Islamic 
faith…especially since…this religious symbol has taken on political 
signifi cance in Turkey in recent years… and [in light of] extremist 
political movements in Turkey which seek to impose on society as a 
whole their religious symbols…33  
It therefore concluded that regulations constitute a measure intend-
ed to achieve the legitimate aims of protecting the ‘rights and freedoms of 
others’ and of the ‘maintenance of public order,’ and ‘thereby to preserve 
the pluralism in the university.’34 
The Court then analysed the proportionality of the measure. It placed 
particular emphasis on the ‘facts’ that ‘students were free, within the lim-
its imposed by educational organisational constraints, to manifest their 
religion in accordance with habitual forms of Muslim observance’35 and 
that ‘university authorities sough to adapt the evolving situation in a way 
that would not bar access to the university to students wearing the veil’ 
despite the fact that prohibitions resulted in the denial of education for 
Leyla Sahin and many other Turkish women.36 The Court also referred 
to what it perceived to be the wide margin of appreciation of the states in 
this area, in concluding that measures were proportionate. These consid-
erations (under Art 9) were also held applicable in respect of the right to 
education, and hence the Court found no violation of that right, despite 
affi rming its importance (as discussed in a number of international docu-
ments) and the need for interpretation in a way that renders it practi-
cal and effective. The Grand Chamber also looked at the discrimination 
claim. It dismissed it without too much consideration on account of the 
prohibition not being directed against the applicant’s religious affi liation, 
following its unsympathetic approach to indirect discrimination, as in 
Dahlab. 
33  N 26 115. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid 159. This is an out-of-context conclusion, since many Muslim women see it as their 
religious duty to wear the veil, which the Court accepted was the case with Leyla Sahin.
36  Leyla Sahin moved out of the country to continue her education in Austria. It is reported 
that, from 1998 to 2000, some 25,000 women were barred from college campuses in Turkey 
because they refused to remove their headscarves. Several hundred government employees 
were fi red, dismissed or transferred for the same reason. See Salbiah Ahmad, ‘Europe: 
Unveiling of Religious Discrimination’ 29 July 2004 <http://www.wluml.org/english/news-
fulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D=x-157-62673>. For a critique of the Court’s conclusion, see 
also Judge Tulken’s dissenting opinion to the Grand Chamber judgment (n 26).
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3. Analysis of the cases
While Dahlab v Switzerland and Leyla Sahin v Turkey concern dif-
ferent categories of applicants and different social contexts, there were 
some common themes, and some common characteristics of the Court’s 
reasoning in these cases. In both cases, the Court accepted that interfer-
ence with the applicants’ rights was ‘necessary in democratic society’ for 
the protection of the rights of others and of public order. In both cases it 
referred to the importance of the principles of religious neutrality/secu-
larism and the principles of gender equality to safeguard the rights of 
others and for public order, accepting the states’ interpretation of these 
principles, referring to their assessment of what was necessary in the 
context of their society.
The difference was that in Dahlab the prohibition was mainly justi-
fi ed by the principle of denominational neutrality in primary state school 
and the protection of young children from undue religious infl uences in 
view of their ‘tender’ age. In this case, gender equality was referred to only 
in once sentence. In Sahin, the prohibition was mainly justifi ed by the 
principle of secularism (as a constitutional order) and the protection of 
the rights of women (who do not wear headscarves). Here, the principle 
of gender equality played a prominent role. In addition, in Sahin great 
emphasis was given to the particular historical context of Turkey, and the 
facts that the majority of the population adhere to the Muslim faith and 
that there were ‘extremist political movements in Turkey.’37
3.1. Secularism,  denominational neutrality of the state, the context 
and margin of appreciation
In both cases it was argued by the government that the prohibitions 
were necessary to safeguard the principles of the separation of state and 
religion, secularism, and the denominational neutrality of the state and 
state education institutions, which served for the protection of religious 
plurality and thereby respect of the rights and freedoms of others. These 
claims raised the question of the relationship of religion and the state, 
religion and international human rights law, and the principle of secular-
ism/neutrality.
International human rights law does not mandate any specifi c rela-
tionship between the state and religion; it only mandates the protection 
of freedom of religion (and other human rights).38 Operating in religiously 
37  N 26 115.
38  While the freedom to hold religious beliefs is absolute, the manifestation of religion can 
be restricted, in accordance with law and when necessary in a democratic society.
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and culturally diverse worlds,39 it starts from the premise that a variety 
of socio-political orders exist that are, in principle, capable of guarantee-
ing human rights.40 However, it accepts (and promotes) the separation of 
state and religion (neutrality/secularism) as a good model conducive to 
protecting religious freedoms.
This is also the approach of the Court. The Court has frequently 
emphasised the state’s role as a neutral and impartial organiser of the 
exercise of various religions, faiths and beliefs, and has stated that this 
role is conductive to public order, religious harmony and tolerance in 
democratic society.41 On the other hand, it has held that:
…where questions concerning the relationship between state and 
religions are at stake on which opinion in a democratic society may 
reasonably differ, the role of the national decision-making body must 
be given special importance in view of the diversity of practices. This 
will notably be the case when it comes to regulating the wearing 
of religious symbols in education institutions, especially in view of 
the diversity of the approaches taken by national authorities on the 
issue. The choice of the extent and form such regulations should 
take must inevitably be left up to the state and it will depend on the 
context.42
Hence, states have a certain margin of appreciation in regulating the 
relationship between religion and the state, and, as part of this question, 
the wearing of religious dress in school. Nevertheless, the margin of ap-
preciation is not supposed to be unlimited: ‘it goes hand in hand with a 
European supervision.’43 The scope of the margin is generally narrower 
where there is consensus among member states and where fundamental 
interests are at stake. 
However, in these cases the Court’s supervision was minimal, even 
though fundamental interests were at stake: the applicants’ rights to par-
ticipate in society, through education and employment, with respect ac-
corded to their religious precepts. Moreover, with regard to the bans on 
39  There are religion-based states, states with an established religion, secular states and 
anti-religious states.
40  The relationship between human rights and religion is complex, stirring many debates, 
among which universalism v cultural relativism. Religion-based states which condition their 
acceptance of international human rights obligations on compatibility with Islamic law pose 
a particular problem for international human rights law. However, secularism might also be 
problematic, particularly in respect of guaranteeing the freedom to manifest religion in the 
public space. See McGoldrick (n 3) 22-28. See also M. Freeman, ‘The Problem of Secularism 
in Human Rights Theory’ (2004) 26(2) Human Rights Quarterly  375.
41  N 26 107.
42  Ibid 109.
43  Ibid.
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headscarves imposed on students, there was consensus on the free choice 
of dress for university students, with Turkey being the only country to 
impose prohibitions.44 The Court did not really scrutinise the challenged 
measures, deferring almost completely to the states’ interpretation of the 
principles of neutrality/secularism and gender equality. 
For example, in Dahlab, the Court accepted that the denominational 
neutrality of the state and its education institutions is necessary in order 
to respect pupils’ and their parents’ religious beliefs and to prevent reli-
gious confl icts, but it did not really discuss what its requirements are. 
Religious pluralism could have arguably been respected by allowing eve-
rybody, including teachers, to freely manifest their beliefs in a non-aggres-
sive manner. This could even better serve the idea of pluralism, as it might 
enhance children’s understanding of diversity and difference. As noted by 
the German Constitutional Court in the similar case of Lund, it is not at 
all so obvious that children are easily infl uenced by teachers’ manifesta-
tion of religion; there is insuffi cient data to indicate any harmful infl uence 
of the headscarf on children.45 Indeed, the applicant in Dahlab argued 
that no impact could be shown, and that the principle of secularism in 
school only demands that teaching be independent of faith, but does not 
prevent teachers from manifesting their religious beliefs. Moreover, Swiss 
secularism anyhow did not prohibit teachers from wearing all religious 
symbols, since ‘discrete religious symbols’ such as small pieces of jewel-
lery were allowed, a fact which was neglected by the Court.
Similarly, the Court did not discuss the meaning of secularism and 
its requirements in respect of the religious dress of students in Sahin. 
The closest it came to discussing what secularism means was when it 
mentioned the principle of neutrality with regard to religion, and the sep-
aration of religious and public spheres. The Court accepted that Turkish 
secularism exhibits these two features, while many have claimed that 
Turkish secularism does not respect either. For example, the Special Rap-
porteur on freedom of religion and belief has criticised the ‘secularism’ of 
Turkey on the grounds, inter alia, that the state is implicated in religious 
affairs by promoting a particular version of Islam, and hence discriminat-
ing against other Muslim and non-Muslim religious communities.46 
In addition, the Court did not discuss whether strict separation be-
tween public and religious spheres was acceptable from the perspective 
of respect for religious freedoms. For example, the German Constitution-
al Court held in the Lund case that opening the sphere of the state for 
44  See the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tulkens to the Grand Chamber Judgment (n 8).
45  N 7.
46  See Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on 
the elimination of all forms of intolerance and discrimination based on religion or belief, Add 
1 Situation in Turkey, UN Doc A/55/280/Add 1 (2000). 
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religions in principle, though with certain limits, allows ‘far more liberty 
than strict exclusion,’ distinguishing between neutrality so defi ned and 
laicism.47 It seems that the Court did not consider the need to respect 
students’ religious beliefs as a requirement of secularism, contrary to the 
way the principle was perceived in Dahlab. Neither did the Court consider 
the link between secularism and the military regime in Turkey.48 In that 
respect, it is interesting to note that in Dahlab the government stated that 
militant secularism does not meet the requirements of neutrality.
Neither of these questions was explored, despite their relevance for 
the ‘particularities’ of the Turkish context to which the Court constantly 
referred as a key factor. It only took two factors to constitute the relevant 
context: that the majority of the population was Muslim, and that there 
was a rise in Islamic fundamentalism. Even then, it did not explore the 
links between the applicant’s wearing of the headscarf and these fac-
tors. Neither did the Court explore the question of the effectiveness of the 
measure to curb fundamentalism, and whether ‘insistence on separating 
their [Muslim] ideals from the country where they live’ might be likely to 
increase, rather than decrease, separatism and fundamentalism.49
3.2. Gender equality 
As mentioned above, in both cases reference was made to gender 
equality as justifi cation for the prohibitions of wearing headscarves. In 
Leyla Sahin, the principle was given greater signifi cance, and it was the 
rights of women that the Court saw in need of protection. In Dahlab, the 
principle was also referred to at one instance, where it was noted that 
‘wearing the headscarf is hard to square with the principle of gender 
equality’, but the case was not discussed in terms of protection of the 
rights of women, but primarily in terms of protection of the rights of 
children.50 However, unlike Lelya Sahin, Dahlab argued sex discrimina-
tion.51
47  N 7.
48  TJ Gunn ‘Fearful Symbols: The Islamic Headscarf and the European Court of Hu-
man Rights’ (2005) Conference paper <http://www.strasbourgconference.org/papers/
Sahin%20by%20Gunn%2021%2 0by%20T.%20Jeremy%20Gunn.pdf>. 
49  N Walter, ‘When the Veil Means Freedom - Respect Women’s Choices that are not Our 
Own, Even if they Include Wearing the Hijab’ The Guardian, 20 January 2004. See also J 
Freedman, ‘Secularism as a Barrier to Integration? The French Dilemma’ (2004) 43(3) Inter-
national Migration 5.  See also reactions to the Leyla Sahin judgment in the Turkish on-line 
journal <www.zaman.org>.
50  This link is actually interesting. Women with children are often classifi ed in law as in 
need of special protection.
51  L Sahin also argued discrimination, but on the basis of religion. The Court [GC] held 
that prohibition was not directed against the applicant’s religious affi liation, but pursued, 
among other things, the legitimate aim of protecting the rights of others and public order. 
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As regard the alleged goal of protecting the rights of women in Sahin, 
the Court did not discuss how the applicant’s actions threatened wom-
en’s rights, or how the principle could justify prohibiting an adult woman 
from following what seemed a freely adopted and personally important 
practice, which did not appear to harm anyone.52 It also did not explore 
the consequences which the prohibition would have for the applicant53 
and thousands of other women in Turkey who would not be able to ac-
cess education.54  It thus seemed that the Court excluded Leyla and other 
women who wear Islamic headscarves from the category of women whose 
rights and equality need to be protected. 
On the other hand, when Dahlab claimed violation of her rights as 
a woman, the Court dismissed her claim on account of the measure not 
being directed against her as a female. The disparate impact on Muslim 
women who consider it their religious duty to wear the headscarf, and the 
disadvantage they suffer on that account, was not suffi cient to constitute 
prima facie discrimination.55 However, such reasoning denies protection 
against indirect, unintentional forms of discrimination: ‘myriad ways in 
which dominant standards and more systemic forms of discrimination 
in our society, which are at face value neutral, tend to disadvantage or 
Hence, the Court does not see the prohibitions as discriminatory on the basis of religion or 
sex, even though the prohibitions clearly have a disparate impact on Muslim women. This 
shows the Court’s lack of understanding of the intersectionality of discrimination.  
52  The applicant claimed that she was not pressured into wearing the headscarf, but con-
sidered it her religious duty. Moreover, she explicitly stated that she did not aim to infl u-
ence other women to wear it. 
53  Leyla Sahin felt strong enough about veiling to take the case to the Court and to move to 
Vienna to study. Not only did the ban prevent her from studying in Turkey, but it may have 
prevented her from living in Turkey, as she would not be able to practise medicine there. 
This has not only hurt her but also Turkish society.
54  As noted by Human Rights Watch, the judgment denies education and a career to a 
signifi cant number of Turkish women who wear the headscarf. See Human Rights Watch, 
‘Memorandum to the Turkish Government on Human Rights Watch’s Concerns with Regard 
to Academic Freedom in Higher Education, and Access to Higher Education for Women Who 
Wear the Headscarf’  29 June 2004 <http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/turkey/2004/
headscarf_memo.pdf>; Turkey: Headscarf Ruling Denies Women Education and Career’ 
16 November 2005 <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/11/16/turkey12038.htm>. See 
also Jonathn Sudgen (HRW Turkey researcher) ‘A Certain Lack of Empathy’, 1 July 2004 
<http://www.zaman.com.tr/webapp-tr/haber.do?haberno=65002>. This judgment might 
also alienate Muslims, which could result in an increase in fundamentalism, which will be 
played out on women’s bodies.
55  The measure could be challenged (by teachers, university staff or civil servants as em-
ployees) as indirect discrimination under EU 2000 Directive on Equal Treatment in Employ-
ment and Occupation (Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000). Blair and Aps 
have argued that, in the UK context, a prohibition on a teacher wearing the jilbab would 
probably always raise a prima facie case of indirect discrimination. See A Blair and W Aps, 
‘What Not to Wear and Other Stories: Addressing Religious Diversity in Schools’ (2005) 
17(1/2) Education and the Law 1.
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exclude members of less powerful groups.’56 Moreover, the Court’s focus 
on potential restrictions on the religious dress of men is in denial of the 
reality that it is Muslim women, and not Muslim men,57 who wear a ‘vis-
ible religious symbol’- the headscarf. Moreover, the applicant took as a 
comparator Muslim men, while the Court changed this to any men.
The Court’s application of the principle of gender equality in the 
‘Islamic headscarf’ cases was simplistic and paternalistic. The ruling dis-
plays a lack of sensitivity to difference, including cultural and religious 
identity, and fails to consider the intersectionality of discrimination.58 In 
interpreting gender equality, the Court dismissed the perspective of those 
affected, and failed to examine the distinct harms that Muslim women 
who wear the ‘Islamic headscarf’ suffer (both imposed by their commu-
nities and the state), and the consequences that the prohibitions would 
have on them. In dismissing the perspectives of the woman in question, 
the Court pitted the principle of gender equality against the principle of 
personal autonomy, to the latter of which it generally gives great value.59
The Court started from the assumption that wearing the headscarf 
is an oppressive patriarchal practice which connotes the submission of 
women to men and the control of their sexuality, which can never be 
freely chosen, while research shows that the practice has a more complex 
meaning (for both wearer and observer), which depends on many different 
factors, including status and power relations in society.60 For example, 
56  T Loenen and PR Rodriguez, Non-Discrimination: Comparative Perspectives (Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague 1999) 199.
57  It might be on account of this that the Court changed the comparator from ‘Muslim men’ 
to ‘men’.
58  The concept of intersectionality of discrimination refers to the interrelatedness of the 
different systems of oppression. It was fi rst developed by feminists of colour: see, eg, Cren-
shaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of An-
tidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Anti-Racist Politics’ [1989] University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 139. For the intersection of discrimination based on sex and sexu-
al orientation, see, eg, Cane, ‘Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories’ (1989) 4 
Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 191.
59  The Court’s reasoning was thus in confl ict with the Court’s case law on the right to 
personal autonomy. Moreover, it was in confl ict with its case law on religious freedom 
and freedom of expression. Finally, the Court’s interpretation of the requirement that the 
prohibition is based in law, its use of the doctrine of the margin of appreciation (in par-
ticular consensus), its emphasis on the particularity of the general societal context, rather 
than on individual injustice and the facts of the case, and its acceptance of restrictions on 
fundamental individual rights on the basis of hypothetical rather than real threats for the 
community as proportionate, even when those restrictions undermine the essence of the 
right to education are in confl ict with the Court’s general approach to interpretation. See 
the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tulkens to the Grand Chamber judgment (n 3). See also 
J Marshall, ‘Freedom of Religious Expression and Gender Equality: Sahin v Turkey’ (2006) 
69 MLR 452.
60  See, eg, D Lyon and D Spini, ‘Unveiling the Headscarf Debate’ (2004) 12 Feminist Legal 
Studies 333; L Abu-Odeh, ‘Post-colonial Feminism and the Veil’ (1993) 43 Feminist Review 
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some women claim that wearing a veil is an act of submission not to men 
but to God. Others claim that wearing the veil actually promotes, rather 
than undermines, their dignity and protects them from unwanted sexual 
advances and objectifi cation.61 Yet others see it as a way of expressing 
identity and an act of resistance to the anti-Muslim policies of the West 
which have been on the increase since 9/11.62 However, the Court com-
pletely neglected these aspects of the intersection of identity and systems 
of discrimination and the particular context of discrimination against 
Muslims. Instead, it focused on the headscarf’s proselytising effect and 
on its alleged link with Islamic fundamentalism.63 Indeed, it seems that 
the Court was more concerned with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism 
(in predominantly Christian Europe) than with gender equality.
While the issue of Islamic fundamentalism (or any other religious/
ideological fundamentalism) and its consequences for women’s rights is 
not to be undermined, the way the Court linked the wearing of the head-
scarf and (the hypothetical threat of) fundamentalism in order to justify 
the prohibition on grounds of gender equality is dubious. Moreover, while 
the practice of veiling is problematic from the perspective of women’s 
rights, since one of its (many) meanings certainly connotes (sexual) con-
trol and the submission of women, and certainly violates women’s hu-
man rights when it is forced on women, wholesale state prohibitions are 
not the appropriate answer. 
This does not mean that the state should remain passive, as it has 
obligations to take steps to ‘eliminate prejudices and other practices 
based on the idea of the inferiority and superiority of either of the sexes 
or on stereotyped roles for women and men which are implicated in at 
least some practices of veiling’.64  The state should thus take measures 
to empower women from these communities by securing their education 
(including education on women’s rights) and employment opportunities, 
and by fi ghting the gender and racial/religious discrimination that they 
face. However, measures which restrict women’s education and employ-
ment opportunities are diffi cult to reconcile with the agenda of gender 
26; D McGoldrick, Human Rights and Religion: The Islamic Headscarf Debate in Europe 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford 2006). For the meaning of the veil in the Turkish context, see AJ 
Secor, ‘The Veil and Urban Space in Istanbul’ (2002) 9 Place and Culture 5.
61  The fundamental question is rather whether women should change their clothing in 
order not to be ‘attractive’, or whether men should change their (sexually harassing) be-
haviour.
62  For discussions by Muslim women on the meaning they assign to veils, see <http://
www.metafi lter.com/mefi /46875>. 
63  See the Grand Chamber judgment (n 26) 115.
64  The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Con-
vention (adopted 18 December 1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13 
art 5(b). 
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equality understood as a challenge to women’s disempowerment and dis-
advantage.
The ‘liberation of women’ is hardly to be achieved by further restrict-
ing their already restricted choices. Dealing with one set of constraints 
(imposed by community/family) by imposing another (through state pro-
hibitions) hardly seems a logical answer, especially when it can result in 
severe consequences for the women in question, including their further 
exclusion and marginalisation. While the prohibition allegedly aims to al-
low women to compete in public spheres and institutions on purportedly 
equal terms with men, free from the private, patriarchal restrictions of 
‘fundamentalist’ fathers, brothers, husbands, etc, it may result in closing 
public spheres to women who are forced to wear the veil, or who fi nd it 
their religious or community duty to wear it. Prohibitions could thus be 
counterproductive, and result in women not leaving their homes, rather 
than leaving their veils at home.65
Moreover, as Judge Tulkens stated, in what can be described as a 
‘different voice’,66 ‘if wearing the headscarf really was contrary to the prin-
ciple of gender equality, then the Court should have imposed on States 
the positive obligation to prohibit it in private places as well’.67 Prohibiting 
the veil only in the public sphere, while allowing it in the private, is not an 
effective way to stop the practice. The Court’s assumption that there was 
a way to reconcile freedom of religion and gender equality by regulating 
religion in the private sphere, and gender equality in the public sphere, 
was unwarranted.
Gender equality cannot be achieved if it is respected only in the pub-
lic sphere, nor can religion be relegated to the private sphere, because 
religious expression is inherently social. As Sunder argued, the con-
struction of the private/public dichotomy in international human rights 
law, according to which the religious sphere is characterised by a lack 
of reason and equality, while the public sphere is characterised by (en-
65  On the other hand, it has been reported that some Muslim women and families found 
the French law of 2004 prohibiting the headscarf in schools to be a liberating experience: 
Sage, ‘The Headscarf Ban is Judged Success as Hostility Fades’ The Times 5 September 
2005, cited in McGoldrick (n 3) 270-275.
66  While other judges engaged in what could be described as ‘the ethics of justice’ in defi n-
ing relevant rights and principles in an abstract manner, without reference to the particu-
lar situation of the applicant, and then balancing them in a hierarchical manner (gender 
equality versus freedom of religion), Judge Tulkens reasoned in an ‘ethics of care’ mode. 
She was sensitive to the applicant’s situation (as constituted by her different identity char-
acteristics and her relationships in society), and was concerned to fi nd a solution which 
would ‘harmonise the principles of secularism, equality and liberty, not… weigh one against 
the other’ para 4 of her Dissenting Opinion.  The idea of a ‘different voice’ was developed by 
Carol Gilligan in her book In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Develop-
ment (1982).  
67   Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tulkens (n 26) 12.
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lightened) reason and equality, does not provide meaningful choices for 
women within religious communities.68 International human rights law 
has to fi nd a way out of the dichotomy to provide women with meaningful 
freedom: freedom within identity, rather than freedom outside identity 
and community, while simultaneously empowering them to change iden-
tities and their communities. The cases at issues failed to do so.
4. Conclusion
Prohibitions on wearing the Islamic headscarf in education institu-
tions raise a number of complicated questions. Among them are respect 
for religious freedoms and of gender equality, and the role of the state and 
international human rights law in safeguarding them (and the functional 
division between the state and international institutions).  These were the 
questions the European Court faced in Leyla Sahin v Turkey and Dahlab 
v Switzerland. However, rather than trying to answer them, the Court 
referred to the state’s interpretation of these principles, emphasising the 
state’s primary role in safeguarding them. 
In both cases, the Court affi rmed the bans on the headscarf (im-
posed on teachers in state primary schools and on university students), 
holding that the state has a right, in the name of gender equality and the 
principle of secularism, to impose restrictions on wearing the headscarf 
due to its ‘proselytising effect’ and the threat it poses to public order and 
to the rights and freedoms of others in the context of the facts of the 
cases. By leaving the issue within the state’s margin of appreciation, the 
Convention organs might have hoped to stay clear of the complex politi-
cal and legal debate. However, by affi rming the ban on the grounds of the 
principles of gender equality and secularism, the Court has been impli-
cated in the debate not only on Islamic headscarves, but on the principle 
of gender equality and secularism, in a manner that has signifi cant nega-
tive consequences for (Muslim) women in view of its powerful position as 
an international human rights court. 
68  See M Sunder, ‘Piercing the Veil’ (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 1399.
